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Title: From democratic participation to civic resistance: The loss of institutional trust as an outcome of 
activism in the refugee solidarity movement1 
Author: Jonas Toubøl, Department of Sociology, University of Copenhagen, jt@soc.ku.dk 
Abstract: Adding to the literature on non-institutional political action and trust, this article argues that 
the loss of institutional trust is not only a cause but also an outcome of political activism. Studying the 
Danish refugee solidarity movement in a mixed-methods research design including survey and 
qualitative interview data, the article shows that three kinds of activism—political activism, humanitarian 
activity, and civil disobedience—relate differently to the loss of trust in the institutions of the Parliament, the 
legal system, and the police. Political activism primarily affects a loss of trust in the Parliament due to low 
external efficacy and a closed political opportunity structure. Civil disobedience affects a loss of trust in 
the legal system and the police due to a perceived lack of procedural justice. Humanitarian activity does 
not affect a loss of institutional trust because it does not imply interaction with the institutions to the 
same extent as the other kinds of activism. The consequence of losing trust in the political institutions 
is not an abandonment of democratic values, nor political apathy, but rather a change in civic 
engagement from a mode of democratically legitimising participation in the institutions to a mode of 
contending and questioning the legitimacy of the political institutions. This qualitative evidence 
                                                            
1 I am grateful to Professor Emeritus Peter Gundelach, University of Copenhagen, Department of Sociology, and Assistant Professor 
Christian Lyhne Ibsen, Michigan State University, School of Human Resources & Labor Relations, for their invaluable comments and 
suggestions. I also wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for insightful and stimulating comments as well as the editorial office for the 
help provided during the editorial process. 
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indicating that loss of institutional trust may cause an increase in extra-institutional political action is 
consistent with the commonly assumed causality in the literature. This leads to a final integrating 
argument for conceptualising activism and loss of institutional trust as reinforcing factors in a process 
where, in line with the main finding of this study, activism may cause a loss of institutional trust which, 
in turn, may cause additional activism, as argued in the existing literature. 
Introduction 
An active citizenry which engages with the central values of democracy and participates in the political 
institutions is of vital importance to modern democracy (Habermas, 1996; Ray, 2004). The legitimacy of 
democracy depends on individuals with the capacities for democratic citizenship in civil society who 
adhere to, as well as legitimise, political institutions due to the experience of being acknowledged 
through inclusion in the political process (Warren, 2011; Welzel et al., 2005; Boje, 2017). Consequently, 
if civil society actors begin to distrust the political institutions, the legitimacy of the very same 
institutions and democracy as such are in peril. This paper shows how a group of civically engaged 
citizens of middle-class origins are gradually turning against the political institutions which they have 
experienced as not adhering to the values underpinning democracy. Instead of turning their back on 
democratic values, the individuals intensify their civic engagement to reinstate such values and 
principles in the institutions. This investigation analyses how activity in the refugee solidarity movement 
in Denmark leads to a loss of trust in political institutions among citizens who are otherwise highly 
engaged in civil society and the political process. 
 Given a shift in political participation from institutional towards non-institutional political activity 
(Dalton, 2008) and political polarisation, with social movements at the heart of the process (Kriesi, 
2012, 2014; McAdam and Kloos, 2014), the question of the links between social movement activity and 
institutional trust gains salience. Even though the proposition that political activism may lead to a loss 
of institutional trust generally would be acknowledged by students of social movement and political 
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protest, the literature on social movement outcomes, nonetheless, tends to be silent on the issue of 
activism and its consequences for institutional trust (Bosi et al., 2016; Giugni et al., 1999). Instead, 
studies of this relationship tend to view institutional trust as a cause generating activism (Ejrnæs, 2017; 
Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Kaase, 1999; Norris, 2011; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2017). 
Supplementing this approach, the overall contribution of this paper is to argue that the loss of 
institutional trust should also be analysed as an outcome of activism. The study suggests that the loss of 
institutional trust and activism should be seen as mutually reinforcing factors in a process where 
activism may cause a loss of trust which, in turn, may generate more activism.  
 The argument for how citizens are turning against the political institutions which they experience 
as not adhering to central democratic values follows three steps: First, the article presents data showing 
that citizens active in the refugee solidarity movement have lower trust in political institutions when 
compared with the general population, apparently because of their activity in the movement. By 
distinguishing between three forms of activism—political activism, humanitarian activity, and civil 
disobedience—and three institutions—the Parliament, the legal system, and the police—it is shown to be likely 
that different kinds of movement activity affect the loss of trust in different institutions. Second, 
exploring the social processes leading to the loss of trust in the different institutions, the article argues 
that the loss in trust stems from the activists’ interaction with the institutions whose procedures are 
experienced as unfair (Jackson et al., 2012; Nix et al., 2015; Tyler, 2003) or suffering from low external 
efficacy (Pollock, 1983). Third, it is argued that the refugee solidarity movement mobilises a group of 
citizens with a strong commitment to civil society and democratic values who, as a reaction to the loss 
of institutional trust, change from participating in the democratically legitimising processes of the 
political institutions to contesting the institutions. 
 The first step is achieved by analyses of unique survey data consisting of 2,289 valid cases, 
collected in the summer of 2016. The survey enables comparison with the general Danish 
population as represented by the European Social Survey (ESS) and the International Social 
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Survey Program (ISSP). Also, 41 in-depth interviews with activists in the movement carried out 
during the spring of 2014 are analysed to substantiate the second step regarding the encounters 
with institutional actors. The third step regarding the shift in civic action uses both survey and 
interview data. 
 The following section two discusses theories concerning trust, civic action, and democracy. 
Section three presents the case of the September Mobilisation of the Danish Refugee Solidary 
Movement in relation to the massive influx of refugees to Europe in the summer of 2015. 
Section four explains the mixed-methods research design. Sections five, six, and seven contain 
the analyses of the relationship between the level and kind of activity and institutional trust, how 
institutional trust is lost in interaction with political institutions, and how this loss of institutional 
trust has consequences for civic activity. Finally, section eight concludes the analyses. 
Activism and trust  
For a long time, the literature has asserted a crucial relationship between trust, civic action, and 
democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963). Trust has often been divided into the categories of generalised 
trust and institutional trust, which are mutually connected in a positive way (Rothstein and Stolle, 
2008), and which influence democratic attitudes and participation (Zmerli and Newton, 2008). This 
study focuses on institutional trust and leaves aside the question of generalised trust.  
 The literature on social movement outcomes tends to be silent on the issue of activism and 
institutional trust (Bosi et al., 2016; Giugni et al., 1999). This is odd considering the overwhelming 
amount of studies on the identity-transforming (e.g., Reger et al., 2008) and radicalising effects of 
participation in movements (e.g., Della Porta, 1995; McAdam, 1988), and most students of political 
activism would probably view it as quite likely that participation in activism can inflict a loss of trust in 
the institutions which the activists confront. Nonetheless, this is not how the relationship between 
activism and institutional trust is conceptualised in the literature. Rather, it is the reverse causality which 
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has been assumed: Several studies have found a negative relationship between institutional trust and 
activism which has been interpreted as low institutional trust causing political activity (Ejrnæs, 2017; 
Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Kaase, 1999; Norris, 2011). Kaase (1999) considers that it might also be the 
case that activism causes a loss of trust, but he finds more support for the opposite interpretation in his 
empirical material. Thus, the theoretical plausibility of the causal relationship proposed by this study 
has been acknowledged in the literature which, however, has lacked studies empirically investigating 
and testing the hypothesis. In the studies arguing for activism being caused by low institutional trust, 
the direction of causality is assumed on theoretical grounds because the underlying data sources are 
cross-sectional surveys which are not well-suited to determine the direction of causality of the observed 
correlations due to the lack of measurement of individual variation over time. The point is not to be 
dismissive of this widely accepted approach. However, the lack of empirical substantiation of the 
assumed causality accentuates the relevance of considering the other possibility, namely, that changes in 
the individual’s institutional trust are not only a cause but may as well be an outcome of involvement in 
activism. 
Relation of trust to partisan and order institutions 
Kaase, summarising the literature, argues that trust is relational and, therefore, its loss (or growth or 
stabilisation) involves interaction between actors, which can be individual, collective, and institutional 
or any combination of those (Kaase, 1999: 2-3). Such interactions vary among institutions, as has been 
convincingly argued by Rothstein and Stolle, who distinguish between partisan institutions, pertaining in 
this case to Parliament, and neutral and order institutions, of which the legal system and the police are 
examples (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008: 447–8). According to the authors, in addition to functioning as 
their effective agents, citizens expect political bias from partisan institutions, but impartially and 
neutrality from the order institutions.  
 For partisan institutions such as the Parliament, trust is associated with political efficacy (e.g., 
Craig et al., 1990; Pollock, 1983). The mechanism is that if individuals believe they lack the 
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competences to participate in the political process (internal efficacy), the individuals are less likely to 
trust the institutions. On the other hand, the political institutions’ responsiveness to their demands 
(external efficacy) will affect their trust in them. For order institutions such as the police and legal 
system, there is a consensus that trust stems mainly from the procedural aspects of justice rather than 
their objective performance (Tyler and Huo, 2002). What matters for trust in legal institutions is having 
personal experiences of high levels of fairness in the exercise of legal authority (Jackson et al., 2012; Nix 
et al., 2015). As will be argued in the analyses below, this focus on the importance of interaction and 
relations offers a most relevant perspective to explain why activism may lead to a loss of trust in order 
institutions. 
 These general considerations will inform the subsequent analyses of how different kinds of 
social-movement-mediated interaction with political institutions can account for variation in the loss of 
institutional trust. This article proposes that activism is not only an important locus for such 
interaction, but also that different kinds of activism lead to different interactions with different 
institutions, potentially resulting in the loss of institutional trust. 
Case: The September Mobilisation of the Refugee Solidary Movement  
The Danish refugee solidarity movement has been active for decades. It is a movement made up of 
what can be broadly characterised as middle-class people and predominantly women. Levels of income 
and education tend to be rather high, and the typical occupations are white collar, public-sector jobs, 
such as teachers, doctors, social counsellors, and the like. The level of social capital is significantly 
higher than that of the general population (see figure AI and table AI in the appendix), and they are 
also highly engaged in civil society, which will be discussed in more detail in the analysis below. In the 
1980s and 1990s, the movement consisted almost exclusively of Danes from the majority culture. 
During the last decade or so, citizens from minority cultures with a recent family history of migration 
increasingly have become active in the movement, and during the mobilisation in 2015, many refugees 
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and non-citizen residents also became active. However, the movement is still made up predominantly 
of middle-class Danes of the majority culture. This socio-economic homogeneity is countered by 
cultural-political diversity: The movement brings together activists from Christian and Jewish 
congregations, networks of left-wing radicals, groups of queer activists, large national NGOs, and local 
community groups (Toubøl, 2015; 2017). 
 In early September 2015, the movement experienced an unprecedented mobilisation in relation 
to the unregulated arrival of an estimated 21,000 refugees (Rigspolitiet, 2015) which took the authorities 
by surprise and caused chaotic scenes at the borders and along the main roads and railways. In contrast 
to the authorities who seemed bewildered, civil society quickly reacted and organised for assisting the 
refugees by enacting a varied repertoire of activities ranging from humanitarian actions, such as 
collecting and donating items and money, political protests, such as petitions and demonstrations, to 
acts of civil disobedience, such as transporting refugees across the border to Sweden or Norway (tables 
III and AV provide overview of the repertoire, see also Gundelach and Toubøl [forthcoming]). This 
phenomenon was not restricted to Denmark, and similar civic action was observed all over Europe 
(Agustin and Jørgensen, 2018; Della Porta, 2018; Fleischmann and Steinhilper, 2017; Hamann and 
Karakayali, 2016; Karakayali, 2017; Zechner and Hansen, 2016).  
 In the Danish case, groups on the social media site Facebook became the dominant vehicle for 
coordination and communication within the movement. Measured by the membership of Facebook 
groups and pages related to the movement, within a month, the movement doubled its membership 
from 30,000 to 60,000, and by the end of the year 2017, it had reached 100,000 (Toubøl, 2017). 
Disregarding labour market conflicts, this was among the largest and most rapid mobilisations of 
Danish civil society since World War II. It becomes even more significant in light of the fact that, since 
the early 1980s, immigration-sceptical views and xenophobia had gradually become more widespread in 
public opinion and adopted by a widening spectrum of the political parties to the extent that a political 
agenda of minimising the number of immigrants and refugees in 2015 had been dominant for at least 
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two decades. Thus, the massive mobilisation represented an unexpected show of support for and 
solidarity with refugees and immigrants that, for a while, challenged the immigrant-sceptical hegemony 
in Danish politics (for more details on the movement, its historical background, and wider context see 
Toubøl [2017]). 
 For this study, the case is strategic for four principal reasons: 1) The fact that Facebook is widely 
used in Danish society and became central to the movement provides the opportunity to survey the 
bulk of the movement members. Often, this opportunity is unavailable to social movement researchers 
because of the informal nature of most movements, which lack membership records or the like that 
would enable the recruitment of a sufficiently large sample. The fact that the movement ‘went online’ 
during the summer and fall of 2015 provides us with an inclusive sampling frame. 2) The September 
mobilisation constitutes a public event fixed in time that people in Denmark in general and activists in 
particular clearly remember, which allows for better retrospective investigation of the event (Belli, 
2014). 3) Focusing on a particular event allows for distinguishing between those who were active 
beforehand and the new activists, which presents itself as the best option for including a time 
dimension in a survey design when a panel study was not possible. 4) Finally, as explained above, the 
movement has a very broad repertoire spanning traditional forms of political action, voluntary work, 
and civil disobedience, which allows for the investigation of how different kinds of activity may change 
the activists’ trust in political institutions. The following section outlines how these research-strategic 
advantages of the case are used in the research design. 
Research design 
The study exploits three data sources in a mixed-methods research design: 1) an online survey of 
members of the movement-related Facebook groups and pages, 2) the Danish samples of the ISSP and 
ESS rounds from 2014, and 3) 41 qualitative interviews with movement activists. In what follows, 
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methodological issues related to the three data sources and their internal relationships in the research 
design are considered.  
 1) The online survey of movement members on Facebook was carried out during the summer of 
2016, inquiring about the events that took place in the fall of 2015. The questionnaire asked 73 
questions about movement activities, general activity in civil society, motives for participating, political 
attitudes, religion, values, and individual and socio-economic characteristics. A total of 2,289 activists 
gave valid responses to the entire questionnaire. The sample displayed substantial variation in general 
and in particular on the key variables of activities, prior experience with activism, being active before 
September or being a newcomer, and social movement organisational (SMO) affiliation. Thus, the 
sample appears to include a selection of most types of activists in the movement with one important 
reservation. Because resources for translation of the survey into languages other than Danish were not 
available, activists with limited Danish language skills – including refugees and some minority Danes – 
are unlikely to have answered the questionnaire. Thus, the sample is not representative of this group of 
movement activists. 
 The respondents were recruited from a total population of about 100,000 Facebook users 
distributed among 287 Facebook groups and pages related to the movement which had been identified 
by a keyword search.2 The recruitment was carried out by posting invitations to participate, including a 
link to the online survey, in the 287 groups and pages, implying that the respondents self-selected to 
participate. Because we do not have the necessary data on the 100,000 members, we cannot assess how 
representative of the movement the self-selected sample is. Even if we could, non-Facebook users 
comprise a minor part of the movement. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the survey constitutes a 
                                                            
2 Keywords: refugee (flygtning), asylum (asyl), racism (racism), foreigner (udlænding), Venligbo (the Danish nomination for a large and new social 
movement which has kindness towards refugees and others in need as its central goal), friends of refugees (flygtningevenner), intercultural 
(interkulturel), the Red Cross (Røde Kors), the Red Cross Youth (Røde Kors Ungdom), the Danish Refugee Council (Dansk Flygtningehjælp), 
DFUNK (the Danish Refugee Council’s youth organisation), Frivillignet (the Danish Refugee Council volunteer organisations), Save The 
Children (Red Barnet), Save The Children Youth (Red Barnet Ungdom), and Amnesty International. 
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representative sample of the movement because the delimitation of the movement population is, in 
practice, impossible, as is often the case with studies of social movements.  
 However, some administrators of Facebook groups and pages offered to circulate the link among 
members who were not on Facebook. This resulted in responses from 42 non-Facebook users. Aside 
from being, on average, three years older, having a higher proportion of men, and, quite naturally, a 
lower rate of participation in social media activities, the non-Facebook users are not significantly 
different from the Facebook users in the sample. This indicates that the sampling frame’s exclusion of 
non-Facebook-users is likely to be unproblematic by itself.  
 In sum, the fact that the sample cannot claim to be representative of the movement population 
implies that, in the subsequent empirical analysis, we are not interested in generalising variable 
distributions from the sample to the population. Instead, we focus on the relationships between 
variables which are likely to be less biased than would be the case with the variable distributions 
(Søgaard et al., 2004). 
 2) To compare patterns in the movement sample with the general population, we use the Danish 
samples of the ISSP and ESS rounds in 2014. The comparison is made possible by replicating several 
questions from the ISSP and ESS in the questionnaire of the movement survey. It is important to be 
aware that the comparisons in the subsequent analysis are only between the sample of the Danish 
population and the movement sample because the movement sample’s generalisability cannot be 
determined, as explained above, in contrast to the population samples. Attempting to remedy this 
shortcoming, in addition to the descriptive statistics, statistical testing is provided to control for 
selection bias when such comparisons are undertaken. 
 3) A total of 42 qualitative interviews with as many movement activists were carried out in the 
spring of 2014. They make up a total of 65.5 hours of recorded conversation and vary in length from 
23 minutes to 2 hours and 28 minutes. The sampling of interview persons aimed at maximal variation 
regarding SMO affiliation, experience and activities, age, and geography. Thus, the aim was to get to 
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know as many corners of this very diverse movement as possible. In general, and like the survey 
sample, the interview persons have an upper-middle-class background, and long-cycle higher education 
is common, as well as a strong political left-leaning. However, there are exceptions, and the sample 
covers the entire educational hierarchy and also includes a few politically right-leaning cases (for more 
information about the empirical data material see Toubøl (2017). 
 The interviews serve both as a source of substantial knowledge about the movement, vital in the 
construction of the survey mentioned above, and an important source of knowledge regarding the exact 
processes underpinning the observed variable relationships. In this study, it is in the second capacity 
that they are used to unpack and provide empirical substance to connections indicated by the 
quantitative analyses.  
 To this end, the fact that the interviews were collected two years before the survey was 
conducted presents a potential problem. However, when it comes to the relationships between activists 
and political institutions, which is the focus of the empirical analysis, nothing gives a reason to believe 
that the relationships should have changed significantly. That is, no overall policy change or change in 
public opinion and discourse regarding the issues of refugees and immigration occurred in the period, 
nothing that ought to have inflicted changes in institutional practice or made the activists’ views more 
or less favourable. If anything, the regulation became stricter and likely to intensify the patterns 
observed in 2014. Thus, even though the massive influx of refugees and mobilisation of activists in 
2015 magnified the scope of activity and intensified the political debate, it is assumed that the refugee 
solidarity activists’ experiences and views of the political institutions in 2014 do not differ significantly 
from those of 2016.  
 In what follows, sparse background information is provided, and identities are obscured to 
ensure the interviewees remain anonymous. These measures are deemed necessary as several of those 
interviewed have been involved in illegal acts of civil disobedience. Thus, disclosure would potentially 
put the interviewees at risk of legal prosecution. 
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The relationship between activity and institutional trust  
The analysis proceeds first by considering survey data suggesting that a loss of institutional trust has 
occurred in relation to movement activity. To analyse different kinds of activism in relation to the loss 
of trust in different institutions, three scales of activism are inductively derived. Then the question of 
the different kinds of activities’ effects on the loss of trust in different kinds of political institutions is 
scrutinised using survey data and data from the interviews. Finally, the likely consequences following 
the loss of trust are analysed. 
Figure I. Average trust in institutions on a scale from 0-10. Comparing the Danish population and the 
movement sample 
 
 
 
γ-value (A.S.E.)      -.268 (.021)  -.093 (.023)  -.187 (.023) 
χ2-value 157.285*** 36.679*** 72.098*** 
OLS-regression coef. (S.E.)1      -.837*** (.106) -.249** (.092) -.184* (.089) 
*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***p<.001.  
1 Controls included: gender, age, civil status, children at home, residential area’s degree of urbanisation, education, employment status, born in Denmark or not, self-
transcending values, values of self-enhancement, political orientation, member of Danish national church, church attendance frequency, history of activism. For estimates see 
appendix Tables AII-AIV. 
n=3,452 
Population-sample is ESS-2014-DK. 
 
Figure I presents a comparison between the general Danish population and the movement sample. The 
pattern is similar to what has been observed in the literature (Ejrnæs, 2017; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; 
Kaase 1999), namely, a lower level of institutional trust among the activists than the general population. 
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However, the answers to the follow-up question summarised in table I indicate that the observed lower 
level of institutional trust in figure I is not just the cause but should also be considered an outcome of 
activism: Table I shows that significant proportions of the respondents answered that, as a 
consequence of being involved in the refugee cause, they lost trust in Parliament (65 per cent), the legal 
system (21 per cent), and the police (10 per cent). With the notable exception of the police,3 hardly any 
respond that their trust has increased. In total, 69 per cent of the activists had lost trust in one or more 
institutions. These figures provide a strong indication of participation in movement activism being a 
cause of a loss of institutional trust, and not only an outcome. 
Table I. Distribution of answers to the question ‘Have what you learned and your experiences 
with the refugee cause changed your trust in the following institutions?’  
Institution 
  Yes, my trust has increased 
 Yes, my trust has declined  No, it did not change 
 
n per cent  n per cent  n per cent 
Parliament 
 
23 1  1483 65  764 34 
Legal System 
 
50 2  487 21  1729 76 
The Police   277 12   227 10   1761 78 
 
Scrutinising the numbers from table I, the first thing to consider is the possibility that the observed 
drop in institutional trust is not due to involvement in movement activity but selection bias. Figure II is 
the smoothed means of the modelled relationships between the number of activities an activist has 
participated in and the loss of institutional trust in the Parliament, the legal system, and the police. The 
three dependent variables are binaries constructed from the question presented in table I with an 
outcome of 1 if the respondent reported a decline of institutional trust in Parliament, the legal system, 
and the police due to being involved in the refugee cause and 0 if trust in the institutions did not 
                                                            
3 The relatively large share of activists responding that their trust in the police has increased is likely due to the perceived relative positive 
role played by the police in September 2015. Generally, the police were depicted in the press as handling the refugees very humanely. This 
tended to overshadow reports of confrontations between activists, refugees, and the police. From the point of view of the activists, this 
positive image of the police’s handling of the situation might, in part, explain the large share of activists whose trust in the police has 
increased. 
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change or increased. It includes a wide range of controls listed in table II. The relationships between 
the number of activities and the loss of institutional trust are all statistically significant. The functional 
form of the relationships depicted in figure II is roughly linear in all cases.  
 
Table II. Logistic regression of the probability for the loss of institutional trust by number of 
activities 
Covariates 
  Parliament   Legal system   Police 
 Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E. 
Focal variable          
Number of activities (0-16)  -0.167*** 0.024  -0.130*** 0.025  -0.090** 0.034 
Control variables          
Income (1-10)  -0.114 0.064  -0.177* 0.075  -0.137 0.106 
Occupation            
Full time  Reference  Reference  Reference 
Part time  -0.108 0.203  -0.038 0.240  -0.030 0.344 
Self-employed  -0.101 0.199  -0.602* 0.221  -0.229 0.343 
Education  -0.031 0.247  -0.001 0.270  -0.518 0.371 
Unemployed  -0.048 0.328  -0.585 0.340  -0.020 0.478 
Early retiree  -0.048 0.303  -0.469 0.322  -0.134 0.455 
Pensioner  -0.154 0.255  -0.277 0.300  -0.385 0.415 
Other  -0.299 0.249  -0.278 0.293  -0.338 0.399 
Work time (1-5) 
 
-0.041 0.049 
 
-0.034 0.060 
 
-0.055 0.088 
Education (1-5)  -0.024 0.057  -0.090 0.062  -0.137 0.083 
Gender             
Female  Reference  Reference  Reference 
Male  -0.100 0.146  -0.023 0.170  -0.612** 0.205 
Do not identify as either  -1.454* 0.642  -0.054 0.686  -1.259 0.711 
Degree of urbanization (1-5) 
 
-0.015 0.044 
 
-0.037 0.049 
 
-0.050 0.067 
Children in household (0-1)  -0.044 0.122  -0.125 0.139  -0.532** 0.199 
Age (Years)  -0.009 0.006  -0.004 0.007  -0.016 0.009 
Refugee (0-1)  -0.411 0.312  -0.034 0.321  -0.324 0.400 
Active in party (0-1)  -0.395* 0.175  -0.021 0.199  -0.154 0.256 
Active in union (0-1)  -0.094 0.163  -0.002 0.189  -0.060 0.251 
Active in religious ass. (0-1)  -0.088 0.188  -0.500* 0.234  -0.133 0.313 
Active in sports ass. (0-1)  -0.178 0.112  -0.078 0.133  -0.257 0.191 
Active in other ass. (0-1)  -0.173 0.113  -0.021 0.128  -0.001 0.175 
Active prior to Sept. (0-1)  -0.081 0.107  -0.127 0.125  -0.270 0.177 
History of other act. (0-6)  -0.010 0.042  -0.051 0.053  -0.088 0.077 
History of refugee act. (0-5)  -0.042 0.055  -0.034 0.064  -0.163 0.088 
Self-transcendent val. (1-8)  -0.128*** 0.029  -0.086* 0.035  -0.090 0.049 
Self-enhancement val. (1-8)  -0.060 0.037  -0.012 0.042  -0.061 0.058 
Political attitude (0-10)  -0.278*** 0.061  -0.152* 0.072  -0.349** 0.105 
Religion             
None  Reference  Reference  Reference 
National Danish Church  -0.001 0.131  -0.142 0.153  -0.122 0.219 
Islam  -0.163 0.389  -0.400 0.382  -0.846 0.459 
Other  -0.140 0.263  -0.247 0.263  -0.343 0.340 
Church attendance freq.(1-5) 
 
-0.013 0.061 
 
-0.085 0.070 
 
-0.029 0.097 
Generalized trust (1-4)  -0.095 0.099  -0.189 0.113  -0.080 0.153 
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Constant  -0.748 0.855  -0.696 0.926  -0.658 1.218 
Degrees of freedom=33   n=1,910. Pseudo R2=.072    n=1,910. Pseudo R2=.064    n=1,910. Pseudo R2=.099  
Notes: Coefficients are log odds. 
*=p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***=p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
Figure II. Probability of the loss of institutional trust by number of activities participated in 
 
Notes: Prediction lines are kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of the predicted values for loss of trust by number of activities. 
The model estimates are reported in table II. 
Considering the controls, political attitudes matter in the sense that the more right-leaning one’s 
political views are, the less probable is a loss of trust in all three political institutions. Also, the value 
scale of self-transcendence – constructed on the basis of Schwartz’s basic human values (Davidov et al., 
2008; Schwartz, 1992) combining values of universalism and benevolence – has a significant effect on 
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the likelihood of losing trust in the Parliament and the legal system. It suggests that the more your basic 
values involve caring for other people and being aware that your fortune depends on the people around 
you, and vice versa, the more probable it is that you lose trust in the political institutions. Finally, 
attention should be directed to the absence of effects of some prominent variables in the literature on 
movement participation. History of activism (Wiltfang and McAdam, 1991) is represented by two 
variables measuring the number of activities the activist has been involved in before September in 
relation to 1) the refugee issue and 2) other political issues. History of activism concerns the experience 
of the activists. The variables’ effects on the outcome variables are insignificant.4 The same is the case 
with the variable measuring whether the activists were active before September enabling us to 
distinguish between veteran activists who were integrated into activist networks when the events 
unfolded in September and novice activists recruited during or after September (McAdam, 1986; 
Schussman and Soule, 2005). The insignificant estimates indicate that the effects are similar for novice 
as well as veteran activists, and prior experience and network integration have little to say in this regard. 
Rather, it is identity measured by values and political attitudes that matter, in addition to the level of 
participation in activities during September. 
  These findings strengthen the hypothesis that the loss of institutional trust is a common 
consequence of participation in activism. Taking this as a point of departure, what follows aims at 
unravelling in detail how participating in the movement activities affects a loss of institutional trust. 
Different outcomes of different activities 
Inspection of the 16 items in the survey that measure activities makes it clear that the different activities 
do not relate in the same way to the loss in trust in the three political institutions (cf. appendix, table 
                                                            
4 The resemblance of the focal variable, number of activities and the history of activism variables raises the suspicion that the same thing is 
measured twice. However, the estimated effects of the two histories of activism variables remain insignificant if excluding number of activities 
from the model except for history of refugee activism becoming significant under the p<0.05 level in relation to loss of trust in the police. 
Thus, in relation to the case under study, the conclusion that history of activism in general does not influence loss of institutional trust 
seems valid with the possible exception of in relation to the police. 
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AV). This suggests that different activities may give rise to different kinds of experiences that can result 
in a loss of trust in the different institutions. To scrutinise this hypothesis, three scales were constructed 
from the activities – political activism, civil disobedience, and humanitarian activity—as summarised in table III. 
These scales are the result of a procedure of optimising Chronbach’s alpha. 
 
Their denominations are the result of interpreting the commonality of the activities on each scale. 
Whereas the civil disobedience and humanitarian activity scales are quite clear-cut, political activism is 
more complex because, in addition to the classical forms of political protest of petitioning and 
demonstrating, it also covers a few common low-cost and low-risk activities (McAdam, 1986) such as 
activity on Facebook or the collection and donation of goods. These activities are not per se political in 
a contentious sense, even though they might be, and donations of goods were certainly considered as 
such in the politically tense days of early September 2015. However, when they are included in a scale 
with political activism, it is due to this being the best solution from a technical point of view as they do 
not make up a good scale on their own or combined with any of the activities. Thus, it should be kept 
in mind that political activism also covers forms of mixed activities. 
Table III. Activity scales 
Activities 
 Activity scales 
 Political activism  Civil disobedience  
Humanitarian 
activity 
1. Posting on Facebook  ×     
2. Liking and sharing Facebook posts  ×     
3. Petitioning  ×     
4. Collecting and donating stuff  ×     
5. Collecting and donating money  ×     
6. Intercultural activity      × 
7. Contact person for refugees      × 
8. Demonstrations and events  ×     
9. Civil disobedience/direct action    ×   
10. Legal assistance      × 
11. Assisting newly arrived refugees      × 
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12. Illegal transportation of refugees    ×   
13. Hiding refugees from authorities    ×   
14. Economic support to underground refugees    ×   
15. Other support to underground refugees    ×   
16. Refugees living in private home      × 
 
The three kinds of activities are far from equally common. Almost all the respondents have performed 
political activities (95.8 per cent); humanitarian activism is also rather common (66.6 per cent), whereas 
civil disobedience is quite rare (8.2 per cent). From this, it follows logically that it is common to have 
performed more than one kind of activism. For instance, among 180 respondents who have been 
involved in civil disobedience, 73.3 per cent have been engaged in both political and humanitarian 
activism as well. Of the 1,469 humanitarians active, only 5.9 per cent were not also engaged in political 
activism. 
Table IV. Logistic statistical analyses of the relationship between the activity and the loss of trust in 
institutions 
Covariates 
 Only focal relations  Including all controls1  Reduced final models2 
 Parliament Legal syst. Police  Parliament Legal syst. Police  Parliament Legal syst. Police 
Political activism 
(0-6) 
 
 .272***  .172***  .132** 
 
 .237***  .145***  .101× 
 
 .235***  .145***  .105* 
 (.030) (.036) (.049)  (.033) (.039) (.054)  (.032) (.038) (.052) 
Civil disobedience 
(0-2) 
 
 .236  .380**  .685*** 
 
 .293×  .418**  .574** 
 
 .294×  .389**  .586*** 
 (.154) (.129) (.150)  (.164) (.139) (.167)  (.161) (.134) (.161) 
Humanitarian 
activism (0-4) 
 
 .058  .074 -.049 
 
  .029  .049 -.072 
 
 .043  .070 -.059 
 (.046) (.050) (.069)  (-.049) (.054) (.076)  (.047) (.051) (.071) 
Number of 
observation (d.f.) 
1,912 (3)   1,912 (34)  1,912 (14) 
Pseudo R2   .043 .025 .028   .078 .066 .107   .070 .055 .089 
Notes: Coefficients are log odds ( S.E.). 
×=p<0.1, *=p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***=p<0.001 
1 Controls included. Individual characteristics: gender, age, children in household, civil status, residential area’s degree of urbanisation, being a refugee. Socio-economic 
status: income, occupation, working time, education. Civil society relations: active in political party, active in religious association, active in labour union, active in sports 
association, active in other association, prior history of other activism, prior history of refugee activism. Values and attitudes: self-transcendent values, self-enhancement values, 
political left-right scale, religion, church attendance, generalised trust. See table AVI in the appendix for estimates of all variables in the models. 
2 See table AVII in the appendix for estimates of all variables in the models. 
Table IV reports the results of the statistical analysis of the three activity scales and their relationship to 
the loss of trust in the three institutions. The table contains only estimates for the focal variables (for 
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estimates of the control variables, see appendix, tables AVI-AVII). The first block of models includes 
only the focal relationships. Political activism has a significant and positive relation to the loss of trust 
in all three institutions. Civil disobedience influences only the legal system and the police, and 
humanitarian activism does not influence a loss of trust in any of the institutions. In the second block, 
all the controls listed in the notes are included (for an estimate of all variables included, consult table 
AVI in the appendix). In the reduced models, all controls which did not have a significant effect on any 
of the dependent variables have been removed (for an estimate of all variables included, consult table 
AVII in the appendix). The only change regarding the focal relationships when including all controls is 
that political activism’s effect on the loss of trust in the police becomes insignificant (still, p<0.1). The 
estimated effect of civil disobedience on the loss of trust in Parliament increases to some extent, but it 
is still insignificant. The reduced model differs only regarding the relation between political activism 
and trust in the police which becomes significant again. Overall, the pattern of the effects of the 
controls is similar to what was observed in the above analysis of the relationship between the number 
of activities and the loss of institutional trust.  
 The test reveals a pattern summarised in table V. Humanitarian activities, such as organising 
intercultural events, assisting newly arrived refugees, or providing legal assistance, tend not to affect a 
loss of trust in any of the three institutions. Political activism, on the other hand, tends to be associated 
with a loss of trust in all three institutions, with the effect on trust in Parliament being by far the 
strongest. The estimated effect on trust in the police is small and not significant when including all 
controls and, therefore, not as robust as the others indicated by the brackets. The effects of civil 
disobedience on the loss of trust in the legal system, and especially the police, are considerably larger and 
significant. 
Table V. Summary of the effects of activism on the loss of institutional trust 
 Parliament Legal system Police 
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Political activism × × (×) 
Civil disobedience - × × 
Humanitarian activity - - - 
 
Trust and interaction with political institutions 
The above quantitative analysis identifies a rather clear pattern of the relationships between different 
kinds of activism and the loss of trust in different political institutions. In this section, an interpretation 
of these relationships is presented and substantiated through analysis of 42 qualitative interviews. Most 
of the interviewed activists, including those quoted below, have substantial experience with the 
workings of the civil service and legal authorities, partly from their working lives in professions such as 
teaching, medicine, and ministry in the national church, and in some cases from serving as elected 
officials and engagement in civil society organisations. The point is, they are far from novices regarding 
the principles and inner workings of the civil service, and their experiences and reactions can thus not 
be ascribed to a general ignorance of the executive dimension of the institutions. 
 The quotes below are selected because they express a general pattern in the interviews. As 
explained in the methods section, identities have been distorted to secure anonymity as some have been 
involved in potentially illegal activities. Thus, background information, names, places, and so forth have 
been altered but still resemble the sociological factors of importance to interpretation.  
 The theory section introduced a distinction between partisan institutions such as the Parliament, 
where trust related to efficacy, and neutral-order institutions such as the legal system and police, where 
trust related to procedural justice. This distinction orders the following analyses. 
 Trust in partisan institutions 
Among the interviewees, internal efficacy did not seem to be the problem. However, external efficacy 
was extremely low. Many perceived the political opportunity structure (Meyer, 2004) to be closed, and 
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they were frustrated by how it was seemingly impossible to get the politicians to respond to their 
demands. For example, Kirsten, a leader of a minor NGO, with a long history of activism by both 
institutional and non-institutional means, summarises the relations to the ministers of the right-wing 
government of 2001-2011 in this way:  
Actually, they got worse and worse, the ministers of integration. I think it was three awful 
ministers. […] Especially Birthe Rønn, extremely rude and condescending in her way of 
speaking about the asylum seekers sometimes. So, we understood that there was no 
possibility of dialogue at that level. 
Hopes were high in 2011 when a shift in government from an immigration-sceptical right-wing 
government to a centre-left government occurred. However, when it turned out that the new 
government would not implement any major political changes pertaining to immigration and refugees, 
disappointment became widespread, as another activist, Hans, summarises below regarding his 
network’s experience with the new government:  
Then I said, ‘Now we have a good government, now we can take it easy’, and then we 
continued at a reduced level of activity for a while. But as so many others, we got 
disappointed by that government, and well, then we must take another stint, so I am back 
in the coordinating committee, and I write flyers again, and the other day I attended a 
demonstration I organised. 
Overall, relations with political actors resulting in a loss of institutional trust are mediated. In both 
quotes, the impression of ‘no possibility of dialogue’ and becoming ‘disappointed by that government’ 
stems, in part, from direct interaction such as contacting the minister. However, it derives more from 
political communication in various media. Such mediated interactions through, for instance, mass-
media engage most people, and it is, therefore, not surprising that a loss of trust in partisan institutions 
is the most widespread form of loss of trust and is associated with the most common form of activism, 
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namely political activism. In contrast, the interactions related to trust in the order institutions are of a 
much more particular kind. 
Trust in order institutions 
As explained above, trust in order institutions has been linked to the level of procedural justice, 
meaning fairness in the interaction between citizen and institutional actors (Jackson et al., 2012; Nix et 
al., 2015; Tyler and Huo, 2002). ‘Fairness’ concerns both the outcome and the fairness of the procedure 
used to arrive at such decisions, but the procedural fairness tends to have primacy as the willingness to 
accept an outcome regarded as unfair increases if the procedure to get there was experienced as fair 
(Tyler, 2003). The locus of experienced fairness is in the encounters and interaction with the individual 
actors of the legal institutions: police officers, judges, clerks, and so forth. Correct and acceptable 
behaviour on the part of the institutional actors in the legal procedure is essential to citizens’ 
experiences of them as fair, which is the main determinant of the legitimacy and level of trust in legal 
institutions (Creutzfeldt and Bradford, 2016; Sprott and Greene, 2010; Tankebe, 2013).  
 This overall insight, that an experience of fair procedures in interactions with institutional actors 
is key for institutional trust and legitimacy, is supported by the qualitative empirical material, from 
which a couple of cases shall be examined. In the first, the activist Jesper assists an underground 
refugee who has decided to come ‘above ground’. The activist makes a deal with the local police 
guaranteeing safe conduct for the refugee. However, things turn out differently at the police station:  
Jesper: Then, in the middle of the meeting, they read out an arrest order, and we are all 
shocked. 
Interviewer: What do you feel in that situation? 
Jesper: Rage. I seriously considered pushing the police officer aside and saying, ‘Now we 
run!’ Then I scolded them, and they stated, ‘We are just performing our duty’, and then I 
said, ‘That, you are not! You promised safe conduct, and you have not kept your promise.’ 
Then I told them a story from my childhood about my father who, during World War II, 
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had a factory in which he hid a lot of police officers from the Germans who were arresting 
the Danish police. ‘Should my father then just have turned them over to the authorities or 
what?’ Then the police officer got very silent. I have never seen a police officer make such 
a strange face. 
Overall, from the encounter in the quote above and also from numerous other interactions with the 
police, both in writing and from telephone conversations, Jesper got a ‘very wicked impression’ of the 
police, even though he underlines that he did ‘encounter police officers who behaved properly’ and that 
he does not claim that all police officers are wicked. Shortly after this episode, he encountered the legal 
system and had many communications with the civil servants in the Immigration Service on behalf of 
the refugee: 
Jesper: In general, I am deeply shocked by the Danish police. And the same with the judge 
who ruled in his case. It is demeaning; it is not worthy of the judiciary. Passing one pro 
forma verdict after the other. And the officials […] who in their letters where they factually 
list all the legal criteria relevant to the case, and then, in the conclusion, ignore what is to 
the benefit of the family and only take into consideration what fits the conclusion, which is 
pre-determined. That, in my opinion, is not proper conduct by a civil servant. A minister 
can do such things; they are just politicians. But when senior civil servants perform such 
acts, that is shocking.  
Interviewer: How did it change your view of the system? 
Jesper: I do not trust it. And that in general. I will always be very critical and inquire into 
different cases in the future. I think the Danish legal system is on top compared 
internationally, but it is far from ideal. Not even close. Thus, when I read the paper and 
watch the news, then I have a different view of some verdicts, which I probably did not 
have before. A much more critical view. 
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In this quote, it becomes very clear that it is the experience of a lack of neutrality within legal 
institutions that provokes him and results in a clearly indicated loss of trust in the legal system when he 
replies that he does ‘not trust it’ when asked how it changed his ‘view of the system’. He then continues 
explaining how, in the future, he will be more critical of the legal system’s decisions than he was before. 
Jesper’s line of reasoning is also in line with Rothstein and Stolle’s distinction between partisan and 
order institutions when he distinguishes between politicians, who he accepts are biased, as opposed to 
civil servants, from whom he expects impartiality. 
 The experience of a lack of objectivity and impartiality in the procedures of the legal institutions 
is common among the interviewees and is viewed as unacceptable and damaging for trust in the 
institutions. The experience that the basic principle of equality before the law is not being applied to the 
refugees led another activist, Bent, to consider the legitimacy of the law: 
Interviewer: What do you experience when you receive such a rejection letter from the 
ministry? 
Bent: Well, you actually experience, that it is a banana republic. It was absolutely evident 
that this woman must be given humanitarian asylum, but the conclusion is a rejection. And 
there was nothing to do. The decision was made in advance. […] 
We grew up with the tripartite division of power, and we grew up believing in the 
incorruptibility of the judiciary, and when you experience that something like the Refugee 
Appeals Board suddenly gets politically infected in a way that fits the political system, then 
you get very, very sad about your country. It was a horrifying awakening. […] In a 
democratic country like ours, to me it shows, how short a distance there is between what 
we believe in and fight for and something very, very atrocious, how easily it may change 
and how careful we must be to avoid this from happening. […] We cannot trust that right 
is right. And, therefore, it becomes legitimate to do something that is very illegal, you get a 
duty to do what is not legal. That is what you feel. 
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This quote brings attention to how the procedural aspect of the law is crucial to the authority of 
the law. The experience that the legal institutions have become partisan makes Bent lose trust in 
them when he concludes that ‘we cannot trust that right is right’ and then extends the line of 
reasoning to an argument for ‘a duty to do what is not legal’. Bent’s experience and reasoning are 
in line with the theory of procedural justice that posits that unfair procedures experienced in 
interaction with the legal authorities undermine not just trust in the legal institutions but also the 
legitimacy and the authority of the law.  
Figure III. Average support of democratic rights on a scale from 1-7. Comparing the Danish 
population and the movement sample 
 
 
γ-value (ASE)       .334 (.027)       .407 (.025)     .033 (.024)       .273 (.021)       .280 (.026) 
χ2-value 139.334*** 216.265*** 22.861** 180.460*** 108.212*** 
OLS-regres. coef. (S.E)1       .079× (.042)       .178*** (.041)     -.141* (.056)       .443*** (.081)       .216*** (.046) 
×=p<0.1; *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001.  
1Controls included: gender, age, education, employment status, children at home, civil status, residential area’s degree of urbanisation, political attitude, history of activism. See 
appendix, tables AVIII-AXII. 
n=3,092 
Population-sample is ISSP-2014-DK. 
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Finally, the consequences of this loss of institutional trust will be analysed. First, the loss of trust in 
political institutions seems not to be related to a rejection of democratic values. Figure III shows that 
support for basic democratic values among the movement sample is higher than among the general 
population with the exception of whether ‘more opportunities for participation in decision-making are 
needed’. Thus, support for the values and principles that the political institutions ought to represent, 
according to the ideals of democracy (Habermas, 1996), seems not to be affected negatively. Hence, the 
loss of institutional trust should be specified as a loss of trust in the institution’s ability to function in 
accordance with these democratic ideals.  
 Second, it would be very wrong to conclude that the studies suggesting that loss of trust leads to 
extra-institutional political action are wrong. Even though the loss of trust is found to be an outcome 
of activism in this study, it does not exclude the opposite causality. It appears quite plausible that the 
next step in the process from the loss of institutional trust due to activism is a change of the political 
action repertoire, which implies less participation in institutional politics and increased extra-
institutional political action, which would explain the observation that the loss of trust leads to activism. 
As table VI shows, even before the events of September 2015 and except for petitioning and donating 
money, the newly engaged movement activists were already significantly more active in the political 
process by both institutional and non-institutional means compared to the general population. Thus, 
they are not new to political action. As a final point of the analysis, we will consider the possibility that 
the loss of trust may affect a change in their repertoire from institutional to extra-institutional politics 
and thereby that the loss of trust due to activism may, in turn, cause an increase in activism. 
Table VI. Political activity prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish 
population and novice activists recruited in September 
Political activity 
 Descriptive %  Models1 
 Population  Movement  Odds Ratio S.E. 
Petitioning  43.23 29.55  0.506*** 0.048 
Product boycott  19.57 25.53  1.340** 0.143 
Demonstration  26.00 45.53  1.923*** 0.181 
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Political meeting  29.18 35.68  1.372** 0.132 
Contacted politician  15.70 20.60  1.345* 0.155 
Donated money  21.90 23.23  1.047 0.111 
Contacted media  11.83 18.09  1.665*** 0.209 
Expressed opinion on the Internet  8.99 14.57  1.878*** 0.264 
Notes: *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001. 
1 Controls included in the logistic regressions: gender, age, civil status, children living at home, employment, education, residential 
area’s degree of urbanisation. For estimates see appendix, tables AXIII-AXX. 
Population-sample is ISSP-2014-DK (n=1747). Movement-sample is activists not active in the movement prior to 
September 2015 (n=982). 
The interviews point to the plausibility of such a change related to a change in their view of the 
legitimacy of political institutions, as a consequence of entering into conflict with the institutions themselves as 
opposed to contending with political opponents in the institutions. The following quote from the activist Karen 
serves to illustrate this:  
The refugee came and said that she would be deported, and brought a pile of papers, and I 
knew nothing about all this, it was an unknown country to me back then, and I thought 
‘This cannot be true, there is civil war in their home country’, […] but the more I read, the 
more I could see in writing that she was going to be deported, and then I thought: ‘What 
do you do? What do you do?’ And then I came to think of my time in Amnesty, so I 
organised a petition. And then I thought, ‘This is what you do in Amnesty, it is kind of 
rude when you think about it. We live in Denmark. Here is rule of law. It is no dictatorship, 
and then you have to use the same methods as when confronting a dictatorship.’ I tell you, 
my world was turned upside down! 
In this quote, Karen, a middle-aged citizen who, in general, takes an active part in the local life in her 
neighbourhood, experiences how the institutions that should uphold democratic values have been 
corrupted. In response, and to her surprise, she is transformed from citizen to activist, employing non-
institutional political means that she imports from a different context, first, to help the refugees who 
are the victims of failing democratic institutions and then to pursue an implied secondary goal of 
reinstating the democratic values and principles. In short, to many of the interviewed activists, civil 
society has changed from a site of inclusion in the political process that underpins the legitimacy of the 
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democracy that they strongly support to a site of organising resistance against what they experience as 
the tyranny of the majority (Tocqueville, 2004) as illustrated by the quotes from both Karen and Bent. 
 In sum, the analysis uncovers a processual interaction between activism and institutional trust: 
Activism may cause a loss of institutional trust that, in turn, may cause more activism due to a shift in 
action repertoire from institutional to extra-institutional political action. The shift is a reaction to the 
loss of institutional trust and accompanying dissatisfaction caused by perceived lack of procedural 
justice as well as low external efficacy which results in the institutions being viewed as failing the ideals 
of democratic rule of law and rational democratic deliberation and inclusion (Harrebye & Ejrnæs, 2015; 
Norris, 1999; 2011). 
Conclusion  
This article has analysed the relationship between movement activity and loss of institutional trust as an 
outcome of the activity to supplement the existing literature, which views a loss of institutional trust as 
a cause of non-institutional political activity. It has shown that movement activity is linearly related to 
the likelihood of losing trust in institutions, and survey data strongly indicates that activism causes the 
loss of trust. While maintaining that the loss of trust may very well lead to activism, the overall 
contribution is to show that the reverse causal relationship is just as likely. This, in turn, questions the 
interpretation of the empirical findings in cross-sectional survey studies which assume that the loss of 
trust causes activism (e.g., Ejrnæs, 2017; Hooghe and Marien, 2013). 
 The analyses show that the loss of trust in the institutions of the Parliament, the legal system, and 
the police is related to different kinds of activism. Political activism, which is by far the most common 
form of activism, relates to a loss of trust in partisan institutions and only to a lesser degree in order 
institutions, whereas civil disobedience is not related to a loss of trust in partisan institutions but in the 
order institutions. Humanitarian activity is not associated with a loss of trust in any of the three 
institutions.  
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 Interview data suggest that the loss of trust in partisan institutions on the one side and the order 
institutions on the other is due to different logics of interaction. The loss of trust in partisan institutions 
is due to low external efficacy, and particularly in the perception of the political opportunity structure as 
closed. The interactions are typically mediated through media and the public debate. On the other 
hand, interactions with order institutions are particular, usually in relation to a specific refugee and 
often face-to-face. Here, the loss of trust is due to the experience of unfair procedures and the lack of 
objectivity and impartiality in the order institutions. 
 The consequence is not lower support for democratic values but a sceptical attitude towards the 
institutions which are experienced as not observing the democratic values and principles from which 
they draw their legitimacy. Therefore, those affected may change their civil activity from legitimising 
participation in the institutionalised political process to a critical stance towards the institution aiming at 
reinstating the values and principles they believe should inhabit the political institutions. Here, the 
traditionally assumed causality is at play because the loss of trust due to activism results, in turn, in a 
shift from institutional to extra-institutional political activism. 
 If such loss of institutional trust is general for the hundreds of thousands of Europeans who 
were mobilised during the summer and fall of 2015, such a movement outcome constitutes a potential 
threat to the legitimacy of the political institutions of Western democracy. In this way, the study sheds 
light on a hitherto largely overlooked element in the Western democratic crisis: In addition to right-
wing populism (Bonikowski Bart, 2017) and traditional left-wing mobilisation of the economically 
deprived, the refugee solidarity movement mobilisation’s alienating effects on the civically engaged 
middle class should be considered. The paradoxical consequence of this mobilisation in defence of 
humanistic and democratic values may be increasing resistance to the political institutions from the part 
of civil society that used to legitimise them because they experience that the institutions—in relation to 
refugees and immigrants—do not adhere to the values underpinning Western democracy. 
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Appendix 
Figure AI. Generalized trust. Comparing Danish population and movement sample 
 
γ-value (A.S.E.): .589 (0.024) χ2-value: 377.250*** OLS-regression coefficient1 (S.E.): .261*** (0.022) 
***=p<.001 
1 The following controls were included: Gender, age, education, employment status, children at home, civil status, residence degree of urbanization, prior history of activism, 
political attitude. See table A4 in appendix for estimates. 
n=3,941 
Population is the ISSP-2014 Danish sample. 
 
Table AI. Generalized trust (1-4). Comparing movement sample and general population 
Covariate Coefficient S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) 0.261 0.022 0.000 0.218 0.304 
Male (0-1) -0.034 0.021 0.111 -0.076 0.008 
Age (Years) 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.003 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) 0.061 0.009 0.000 0.043 0.078 
Job status (0-1) 0.054 0.020 0.008 0.014 0.094 
Children in household (0-1) 0.018 0.021 0.399 -0.024 0.060 
Civil status (0-1) 0.033 0.021 0.115 -0.008 0.075 
Residence degree of urbanization (1-5) -0.005 0.010 0.580 -0.024 0.014 
History of activism (0-2) 0.016 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.026 
Political attitude (0-10) -0.022 0.004 0.000 -0.030 -0.015 
Constant 2.660 0.060 0.000 2.543 2.777 
n=3,732. R2=.126. df=10. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample. 
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Table AII. Trust in parliament (0-10). Comparing movement sample and general population 
Covariate Coefficient S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) -0.837 0.106 0.000 -1.045 -0.630 
Male (0-1) 0.370 0.099 0.000 0.176 0.565 
Age (Years) -0.013 0.003 0.000 -0.018 -0.007 
Self-transcendent values (0-4) -0.067 0.034 0.048 -0.134 0.000 
Self-enhancement values (0-4) 0.063 0.070 0.365 -0.074 0.200 
Civil status (0-1) 0.403 0.093 0.000 0.220 0.585 
Children in household (0-1) -0.185 0.099 0.060 -0.378 0.008 
Residence degree of urbanization (1-5) 0.116 0.035 0.001 0.048 0.184 
Political attitude (0-10) 0.092 0.019 0.000 0.055 0.130 
Member of national church (0-1) 0.487 0.094 0.000 0.304 0.671 
Church attendance frequency (1-5) 0.060 0.039 0.128 -0.017 0.138 
Born in Denmark (0-1) -0.229 0.185 0.216 -0.591 0.134 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) 0.286 0.040 0.000 0.208 0.365 
Job status (0-1) -0.045 0.093 0.632 -0.227 0.138 
History of activism (0-2) 0.180 0.049 0.000 0.084 0.276 
Constant 4.260 0.316 0.000 3.641 4.879 
n=3,452. R2=.099. df=15. General population is ESS round 2014 Danish sample. 
 
 
Table AIII. Trust in legal system (0-10). Comparing movement sample and general population 
Covariate Coefficient S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) -0.249 0.092 0.007 -0.428 -0.069 
Male (0-1) 0.210 0.086 0.014 0.042 0.378 
Age (Years) 0.003 0.003 0.280 -0.002 0.008 
Self-transcendent values (0-4) 0.011 0.029 0.716 -0.047 0.069 
Self-enhancement values (0-4) -0.057 0.061 0.346 -0.176 0.062 
Civil status (0-1) 0.304 0.081 0.000 0.146 0.462 
Children in household (0-1) -0.063 0.085 0.461 -0.230 0.104 
Residence degree of urbanization (1-5) 0.103 0.030 0.001 0.044 0.162 
Political attitude (0-10) 0.078 0.017 0.000 0.046 0.111 
Member of national church (0-1) 0.358 0.081 0.000 0.198 0.517 
Church attendance frequency (1-5) -0.005 0.034 0.895 -0.072 0.063 
Born in Denmark (0-1) 0.140 0.160 0.383 -0.175 0.454 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) 0.246 0.035 0.000 0.178 0.314 
Job status (0-1) -0.056 0.081 0.489 -0.214 0.102 
History of activism (0-2) 0.119 0.042 0.005 0.036 0.202 
Constant 5.131 0.274 0.000 4.595 5.668 
n=3,452. R2=.055. df=15. General population is ESS round 2014 Danish sample. 
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Table AIV. Trust in police (0-10). Comparing movement sample and general population 
Covariate Coefficient S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) -0.184 0.089 0.038 -0.359 -0.010 
Male (0-1) -0.134 0.083 0.107 -0.297 0.029 
Age (Years) 0.001 0.002 0.835 -0.004 0.005 
Self-transcendent values (0-4) 0.025 0.029 0.387 -0.031 0.081 
Self-enhancement values (0-4) -0.044 0.059 0.453 -0.159 0.071 
Civil status (0-1) 0.258 0.078 0.001 0.105 0.411 
Children in household (0-1) 0.126 0.083 0.128 -0.036 0.288 
Residence degree of urbanization (1-5) -0.014 0.029 0.623 -0.072 0.043 
Political attitude (0-10) 0.166 0.016 0.000 0.134 0.198 
Member of national church (0-1) 0.471 0.079 0.000 0.317 0.626 
Church attendance frequency (1-5) 0.059 0.033 0.074 -0.006 0.124 
Born in Denmark (0-1) 0.106 0.156 0.495 -0.199 0.411 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) 0.038 0.034 0.265 -0.029 0.104 
Job status (0-1) 0.049 0.078 0.528 -0.104 0.203 
History of activism (0-2) 0.063 0.041 0.124 -0.017 0.144 
Constant 6.068 0.265 0.000 5.548 6.588 
n=3,452. R2=.088. df=15. General population is ESS round 2014 Danish sample. 
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Table AV. γ-coefficient for relation between activity and decline in institutional trust 
Activity 
 Loss of institutional trust  Avg. org. 
Cap. (0-18) 
 n  Parliament  Legal syst.  Police   
Posting on Facebook  0.31***  0.21***  0.05  7.99  1,447 
Liking and sharing Facebook posts  0.32***  0.15*  0.09  7.96  1,706 
Petitioning  0.43***  0.30***  0.31***  7.98  1,009 
Collecting and donating goods  0.24***  0.01  -0.02  8.05  1,511 
Collecting and donating money  0.23***  0.19**  0.11  8.12  1,065 
Intercultural activity  0.10*  0.09  -0.03  8.11  1,152 
Contact-person for refugees  0.07  0.03  -0.08  8.12  846 
Demonstrations and happenings  0.33***  0.31***  0.42***  8.03  597 
Civil disobedient direct action  0.25  0.51***  0.64***  8.63  76 
legal assistance  0.14*  0.13*  0.22*  8.14  369 
Assisting newly arrived refugees  0.24**  0.13  0.16  8.33  195 
Illegal transportation of refugees  0.18  0.56***  0.56**  8.10  29 
Hiding refugees from authorities  -0.01  0.57**  0.67**  7.64  14 
Econ. support to underground refugees 0.31**  0.32**  0.4***  8.33  118 
Other support to underground refugees   0.14  0.32  0.5**  8.63  41 
Refugees living in private home   0.32**  0.41***  0.47***  8.17   94 
Note: ***=χ2 p-value<0.001; **=χ2 p-value<0.01; *=χ2 p-value<0.05.  
For cell-fill: Light grey= 0.1<γ<0.2; medium grey= 0.2<γ<0.4; Dark grey= 0.4<γ 
 
The movement has a broad repertoire. The items measuring the repertoire are listed in table AV. The 
same activist may have performed all 16 kinds of activities in the repertoire. The mean is 4.5 with a S.D. 
of 2.5. The γ-coefficients express the activities relation to loss of institutional trust and grey cell-fill 
indicates the strength of the relation. Almost all activities of the repertoire relate to a significant loss of 
trust in parliament, whereas the relations to loss of trust in the legal system and the police are more 
varied. The fifth column is a measure of integration in civil society or the activists organizational 
capital. Depending on present and prior membership as well as status as active in different kinds of civil 
society organizations, the respondent can obtain a score from 0-18. The score increases with the 
number of kinds of associations the respondent are related to. Here it reveals that there is only minor 
differences in the civil society integration between those engaged in the different kinds of activities. 
This is taken to justify that a loss of institutional trust related to the different activities are equally 
related to the civic engagement and civil society. 
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Table AVI. Kinds of activity and loss of institutional trust – all controls 
Covariates 
  Parliament   Legal system   Police 
 Coefficient S.E. p-value  Coefficient S.E. p-value  Coefficient S.E. p-value 
Political activism (0-6)  0.237 0.033 0.000  0.145 0.039 0.000  0.101 0.054 0.061 
Civil disobedience (0-2)  0.293 0.164 0.073  0.418 0.139 0.003  0.574 0.167 0.001 
Humanitarian activity (0-4)  0.029 0.049 0.558  0.049 0.054 0.363  -0.073 0.076 0.341 
Income (1-10)  -0.117 0.064 0.070  -0.182 0.075 0.015  -0.143 0.107 0.179 
Occupation             
Full time  Reference  Reference  Reference 
Part time  0.105 0.203 0.605  0.027 0.241 0.912  0.013 0.345 0.971 
Self-employed  -0.096 0.199 0.631  0.599 0.222 0.007  0.208 0.349 0.552 
Education  0.020 0.248 0.934  -0.015 0.271 0.956  -0.526 0.373 0.158 
Unemployed  0.047 0.329 0.886  0.584 0.340 0.086  -0.047 0.484 0.922 
Early retiree  0.028 0.304 0.928  0.445 0.323 0.167  0.096 0.458 0.833 
Pensioner  -0.115 0.256 0.654  0.307 0.301 0.307  0.456 0.417 0.275 
Other  -0.290 0.250 0.245  0.303 0.293 0.301  0.403 0.400 0.314 
Work time (1-5) 
 
-0.049 0.050 0.326 
 
0.031 0.060 0.604 
 
-0.062 0.088 0.486 
Education (1-5)  0.020 0.058 0.729  -0.095 0.062 0.126  -0.143 0.083 0.086 
Gender             
Female  Reference  Reference  Reference 
Male  -0.088 0.147 0.547  0.006 0.171 0.971  0.574 0.208 0.006 
Do not identify as either  -1.486 0.644 0.021  -0.066 0.701 0.925  1.059 0.739 0.152 
Degree of urbanization (1-5) 
 
-0.033 0.045 0.459 
 
-0.048 0.049 0.328 
 
0.027 0.068 0.695 
Children in household (0-1)  -0.066 0.123 0.591  -0.119 0.139 0.393  -0.511 0.200 0.011 
Age (Years)  0.010 0.006 0.091  -0.003 0.007 0.651  -0.015 0.009 0.096 
Refugee (0-1)  -0.430 0.313 0.170  0.025 0.322 0.938  -0.317 0.406 0.435 
Active in party (0-1)  -0.422 0.176 0.017  0.003 0.200 0.986  0.136 0.258 0.599 
Active in union (0-1)  -0.125 0.164 0.445  -0.020 0.191 0.915  0.033 0.253 0.895 
Active in religious ass. (0-1)  0.097 0.189 0.606  -0.522 0.235 0.027  0.090 0.317 0.776 
Active in sports ass. (0-1)  -0.163 0.112 0.145  -0.065 0.133 0.625  -0.224 0.192 0.245 
Active in other ass. (0-1)  -0.141 0.113 0.213  0.035 0.128 0.786  0.030 0.177 0.864 
Active prior to Sept. (0-1)  0.085 0.108 0.428  0.129 0.125 0.304  0.268 0.177 0.130 
History of other act. (0-6)  -0.008 0.043 0.859  -0.050 0.053 0.346  -0.088 0.078 0.257 
History of refugee act. (0-5)  0.024 0.056 0.663  0.023 0.065 0.719  0.150 0.089 0.090 
Self-transcendent values (1-
8) 
 0.125 0.029 0.000  0.090 0.035 0.011  0.100 0.050 0.046 
Self-enhancement val. (1-8)  0.061 0.037 0.098  -0.012 0.042 0.776  0.064 0.058 0.273 
Political attitude (0-10)  -0.263 0.062 0.000  -0.138 0.073 0.058  -0.316 0.106 0.003 
Religion             
None  Reference  Reference  Reference 
National Danish Church  0.002 0.132 0.989  -0.139 0.153 0.365  -0.118 0.220 0.591 
Islam  -0.150 0.391 0.700  0.406 0.384 0.290  0.874 0.466 0.061 
Other  0.138 0.264 0.602  0.233 0.264 0.377  0.313 0.344 0.362 
Church attendance freq. (1-
5) 
 
-0.004 0.062 0.943 
 
0.094 0.071 0.183 
 
0.046 0.098 0.638 
Generalized trust (1-4)  -0.085 0.099 0.394  -0.201 0.113 0.076  -0.116 0.156 0.457 
Constant  0.708 0.860 0.410  -0.631 0.930 0.498  -0.558 1.233 0.651 
 df=35   n=1,910. Pseudo R2=.078.    n=1,910. Pseudo R2=.066.    n=1,910. Pseudo R2=.107.  
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Table AVII. Kinds of activity and loss of institutional trust – reduced models 
Covariates 
  Parliament   Legal system   Police 
 Coefficient S.E. p-value  Coefficient S.E. p-value  Coefficient S.E. p-value 
Political activism (0-6)  0.235 0.032 0.000  0.145 0.038 0.000  0.105 0.052 0.045 
Civil disobedience (0-2)  0.294 0.161 0.068  0.389 0.135 0.004  0.586 0.161 0.000 
Humanitarian activity (0-4)  0.043 0.047 0.364  0.070 0.051 0.168  -0.059 0.072 0.407 
Income (1-10)  -0.089 0.046 0.054  -0.225 0.053 0.000  -0.204 0.074 0.006 
Gender             
Female  Reference  Reference  Reference 
Male  -0.078 0.143 0.584  0.024 0.167 0.886  0.640 0.201 0.001 
Do not identify as either  -1.660 0.647 0.010  0.059 0.686 0.932  0.970 0.725 0.181 
Children in household (0-1) 
 
-0.131 0.108 0.223 
 
-0.151 0.124 0.224 
 
-0.549 0.183 0.003 
Active in party (0-1)  -0.421 0.172 0.014  0.059 0.195 0.761  0.203 0.248 0.414 
Self-transcendent values (1-
8) 
 0.114 0.028 0.000  0.095 0.035 0.006  0.108 0.049 0.027 
Political attitude (0-10)  -0.257 0.059 0.000  -0.129 0.070 0.065  -0.311 0.101 0.002 
Religion             
None  Reference  Reference  Reference 
National Danish Church  0.059 0.109 0.589  -0.130 0.129 0.315  -0.068 0.185 0.715 
Islam  -0.139 0.373 0.709  0.433 0.359 0.227  1.021 0.415 0.014 
Other  0.200 0.249 0.424  0.238 0.246 0.333  0.413 0.315 0.191 
Generalized trust (1-4) 
 
-0.105 0.097 0.282 
 
-0.225 0.111 0.043 
 
-0.161 0.152 0.290 
Constant  0.468 0.394 0.235  -0.800 0.453 0.077  -1.527 0.628 0.015 
df=14   n=1,910. Pseudo R2=.070.   n=1,910. Pseudo R2=.055.   n=1,910. Pseudo R2=.089. 
 
 
 
Table AVIII. ‘How important is it That all citizens have an adequate standard of Living?’ (1-7). Comparing 
movement sample and general population 
Covariate Coefficient S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) 0.079 0.042 0.059 -0.003 0.160 
Male (0-1) -0.218 0.040 0.000 -0.296 -0.141 
Age (Years) 0.003 0.001 0.019 0.000 0.005 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) -0.042 0.017 0.014 -0.075 -0.008 
Job status (0-1) -0.144 0.038 0.000 -0.218 -0.069 
Children in household (0-1) 0.023 0.041 0.564 -0.056 0.103 
Civil status (0-1) -0.040 0.040 0.317 -0.119 0.038 
Degree of urbanization (1-5) 0.014 0.018 0.449 -0.022 0.049 
History of activism (0-2) -0.011 0.010 0.264 -0.030 0.008 
Political attitude (0-10) -0.112 0.007 0.000 -0.126 -0.098 
Constant 6.974 0.114 0.000 6.750 7.197 
n=3,092. R2=.131. df=10. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample. 
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Table AIX. ‘How important is it That government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities?’ (1-7). 
Comparing movement sample and general population 
Covariate Coefficient S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) 0.178 0.041 0.000 0.097 0.259 
Male (0-1) -0.115 0.039 0.003 -0.192 -0.038 
Age (Years) 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.012 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) 0.031 0.017 0.066 -0.002 0.064 
Job status (0-1) -0.128 0.038 0.001 -0.202 -0.054 
Children in household (0-1) 0.037 0.040 0.362 -0.042 0.115 
Civil status (0-1) -0.031 0.040 0.438 -0.109 0.047 
Degree of urbanization (1-5) 0.014 0.018 0.425 -0.021 0.050 
History of activism (0-2) 0.017 0.009 0.072 -0.002 0.036 
Political attitude (0-10) -0.090 0.007 0.000 -0.104 -0.076 
Constant 6.121 0.113 0.000 5.899 6.342 
n=3,092. R2=.133. df=10. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample. 
 
 
Table AX. ‘How important is it That people be given more opportunities to participate in public decision-making?’ 
(1-7). Comparing movement sample and general population 
Covariate Coefficient S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) -0.141 0.056 0.012 -0.251 -0.032 
Male (0-1) -0.079 0.053 0.138 -0.183 0.025 
Age (Years) 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.009 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) -0.045 0.023 0.048 -0.090 0.000 
Job status (0-1) 0.039 0.051 0.453 -0.062 0.139 
Children in household (0-1) -0.140 0.055 0.010 -0.247 -0.033 
Civil status (0-1) -0.139 0.054 0.010 -0.245 -0.034 
Degree of urbanization (1-5) 0.001 0.024 0.968 -0.047 0.049 
History of activism (0-2) 0.004 0.013 0.755 -0.021 0.029 
Political attitude (0-10) -0.102 0.010 0.000 -0.121 -0.084 
Constant 6.261 0.153 0.000 5.960 6.561 
n=3,092. R2=.050. df=10. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample. 
 
 
Table AXI. ‘How important is it That citizens may engage in acts of civil disobedience when they oppose 
government actions.?’ (1-7). Comparing movement sample and general population 
Covariate Coefficient S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) 0.443 0.081 0.000 0.285 0.602 
Male (0-1) 0.198 0.077 0.010 0.048 0.348 
Age (Years) -0.004 0.002 0.100 -0.008 0.001 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) 0.028 0.033 0.387 -0.036 0.093 
Job status (0-1) -0.159 0.074 0.032 -0.304 -0.014 
Children in household (0-1) -0.111 0.079 0.156 -0.266 0.043 
Civil status (0-1) -0.275 0.078 0.000 -0.427 -0.123 
Degree of urbanization (1-5) 0.069 0.035 0.050 0.000 0.138 
History of activism (0-2) 0.049 0.019 0.009 0.012 0.085 
Political attitude (0-10) -0.185 0.014 0.000 -0.212 -0.158 
Constant 5.032 0.221 0.000 4.599 5.465 
n=3,092. R2=.116. df=10. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample. 
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Table AXII. ‘How important is it That governments respect democratic rights whatever the circumstances’ (1-7). 
Comparing movement sample and general population 
Covariate Coefficient S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) 0.216 0.046 0.000 0.127 0.306 
Male (0-1) 0.045 0.043 0.300 -0.040 0.130 
Age (Years) 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.008 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) 0.069 0.019 0.000 0.033 0.106 
Job status (0-1) -0.053 0.042 0.211 -0.135 0.030 
Children in household (0-1) -0.046 0.045 0.306 -0.133 0.042 
Civil status (0-1) -0.096 0.044 0.030 -0.182 -0.009 
Degree of urbanization (1-5) 0.032 0.020 0.114 -0.008 0.071 
History of activism (0-2) 0.013 0.011 0.212 -0.008 0.034 
Political attitude (0-10) -0.049 0.008 0.000 -0.064 -0.033 
Constant 5.823 0.125 0.000 5.577 6.068 
n=3,092. R2=.059. df=10. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample. 
 
 
Table AXIII. Petitioning prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and new 
movement members in September 
Covariate Odds ratio S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) 0.407 0.038 0.000 0.339 0.487 
Male (0-1) 1.011 0.087 0.895 0.854 1.198 
Age (Years) 1.011 0.003 0.000 1.005 1.016 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) 1.143 0.043 0.000 1.061 1.231 
Job status (0-1) 1.231 0.110 0.020 1.034 1.466 
Children in household (0-1) 1.107 0.104 0.278 0.921 1.331 
Civil status (0-1) 1.381 0.132 0.001 1.146 1.665 
Degree of urbanization (1-5) 0.945 0.039 0.167 0.872 1.024 
Constant 0.226 0.056 0.000 0.139 0.367 
n=3,022. Pseudo R2=.044. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample. 
 
 
Table AXIV. Product boycott prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and new 
movement members in September 
Covariate Odds ratio S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) 1.203 0.123 0.072 0.984 1.470 
Male (0-1) 0.985 0.100 0.884 0.807 1.203 
Age (Years) 1.015 0.003 0.000 1.009 1.022 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) 1.051 0.047 0.267 0.963 1.146 
Job status (0-1) 1.257 0.130 0.027 1.026 1.540 
Children in household (0-1) 1.288 0.138 0.018 1.044 1.588 
Civil status (0-1) 1.223 0.133 0.065 0.988 1.515 
Degree of urbanization (1-5) 1.038 0.049 0.430 0.946 1.139 
Constant 0.060 0.018 0.000 0.033 0.108 
n=3,022. Pseudo R2=.015. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample. 
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Table AXV. Demonstration prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and new 
movement members in September 
Covariate Odds ratio S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) 1.616 0.145 0.000 1.355 1.928 
Male (0-1) 0.794 0.073 0.012 0.663 0.951 
Age (Years) 1.005 0.003 0.070 1.000 1.011 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) 1.338 0.055 0.000 1.235 1.450 
Job status (0-1) 1.152 0.104 0.119 0.964 1.375 
Children in household (0-1) 1.121 0.106 0.229 0.931 1.350 
Civil status (0-1) 1.074 0.101 0.451 0.892 1.292 
Degree of urbanization (1-5) 0.968 0.041 0.448 0.892 1.052 
Constant 0.100 0.026 0.000 0.060 0.167 
n=3,022. Pseudo R2=.044. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample. 
 
 
Table AXVI. Political meeting prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and new 
movement members in September 
Covariate Odds ratio S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) 1.351 0.121 0.001 1.133 1.611 
Male (0-1) 1.036 0.092 0.694 0.870 1.234 
Age (Years) 1.017 0.003 0.000 1.011 1.022 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) 1.151 0.045 0.000 1.066 1.242 
Job status (0-1) 1.102 0.099 0.280 0.924 1.313 
Children in household (0-1) 1.128 0.107 0.205 0.936 1.358 
Civil status (0-1) 1.028 0.096 0.765 0.856 1.234 
Degree of urbanization (1-5) 0.952 0.039 0.228 0.878 1.032 
Constant 0.114 0.029 0.000 0.069 0.188 
n=3,022. Pseudo R2=.023. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample. 
 
 
Table AXVII. Contact politician prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and 
new movement members in September 
Covariate Odds ratio S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) 1.934 0.204 0.000 1.573 2.378 
Male (0-1) 1.070 0.114 0.524 0.869 1.317 
Age (Years) 1.023 0.004 0.000 1.016 1.030 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) 1.104 0.052 0.036 1.007 1.211 
Job status (0-1) 1.363 0.147 0.004 1.104 1.682 
Children in household (0-1) 1.220 0.136 0.075 0.980 1.518 
Civil status (0-1) 1.162 0.129 0.176 0.935 1.445 
Degree of urbanization (1-5) 0.907 0.043 0.040 0.827 0.995 
Constant 0.038 0.012 0.000 0.020 0.072 
n=3,022. Pseudo R2=.043. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample. 
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Table AXVIII. Donated money prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and 
new movement members in September 
Covariate Coefficient S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) 1.070 0.106 0.493 0.881 1.301 
Male (0-1) 0.978 0.096 0.825 0.807 1.187 
Age (Years) 0.998 0.003 0.583 0.993 1.004 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) 1.066 0.045 0.129 0.982 1.157 
Job status (0-1) 0.946 0.092 0.570 0.782 1.145 
Children in household (0-1) 1.076 0.111 0.480 0.878 1.318 
Civil status (0-1) 0.869 0.087 0.163 0.714 1.058 
Degree of urbanization (1-5) 1.051 0.049 0.289 0.959 1.151 
Constant 0.237 0.063 0.000 0.140 0.399 
n=3,022. Pseudo R2=.003. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample. 
 
 
Table AXIX. Contact the media prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish population and 
new movement members in September 
Covariate Coefficient S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) 2.061 0.235 0.000 1.648 2.578 
Male (0-1) 1.047 0.122 0.694 0.834 1.314 
Age (Years) 1.017 0.004 0.000 1.010 1.025 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) 1.197 0.062 0.001 1.081 1.326 
Job status (0-1) 1.154 0.132 0.210 0.922 1.443 
Children in household (0-1) 1.000 0.122 1.000 0.788 1.270 
Civil status (0-1) 0.885 0.102 0.287 0.706 1.109 
Degree of urbanization (1-5) 0.900 0.046 0.041 0.814 0.996 
Constant 0.041 0.014 0.000 0.021 0.079 
n=3,022. Pseudo R2=.043. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample. 
 
 
Table AXX. Expressed political views on internet prior to September 2015. Comparing the Danish 
population and new movement members in September 
Covariate Coefficient S.E. p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Population-Movement (0-1) 1.947 0.261 0.000 1.498 2.532 
Male (0-1) 1.345 0.178 0.025 1.037 1.743 
Age (Years) 0.982 0.004 0.000 0.974 0.990 
Level of educational attainment (1-5) 1.121 0.064 0.045 1.002 1.255 
Job status (0-1) 1.378 0.182 0.015 1.064 1.786 
Children in household (0-1) 1.102 0.143 0.455 0.854 1.422 
Civil status (0-1) 0.854 0.112 0.232 0.660 1.106 
Degree of urbanization (1-5) 1.014 0.063 0.828 0.897 1.145 
Constant 0.111 0.039 0.000 0.055 0.221 
n=3,022. Pseudo R2=.036. df=8. General population is ISSP round 2014 Danish sample. 
 
 
